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Heidegger's Appropriation of Kant 
 
 
Being and Time, Heidegger praises Kant as “the first and only person who has gone any stretch 
of the way towards investigating the dimension of temporality or has even let himself be drawn 
hither by the coercion of the phenomena themselves” (SZ: 23).1 Kant was, before Husserl (and 
perhaps, in Heidegger's mind, more than him), a true phenomenologist in the sense that the need 
to curtail the pretension of dogmatic metaphysics to overstep the boundaries of sensible 
experience led him to focus on phenomena and the conditions of their disclosure: thus, the 
“question of the inner possibility of such knowledge  of the super-sensible , however, is 
presented as thrown back upon the more general question of the inner possibility of a general 
making-manifest(Offenbarmachen) of beings (Seiende) as such” (GA 3: 10, emphasis supplied).  
So Kant shouldn’t be read as an epistemologist (contrary to Descartes, for example), but as an 
ontologist2: “Kant's inquiry is concerned with what determines nature as such -- occurrent beings 
as such -- and with how this ontological determinability is possible” (GA 25: 75).  Heidegger 
sees this investigation into the “ontological determinability” of entities as an a priori form of 
inquiry: “what is already opened up and projected in advance  ie the horizon of ontological 
determinability  . . .  is what in a certain sense is “earlier” than a being and is called a priori” 
(GA 25: 37).  This a priori character of ontological determinability forms the main link between 
Kant's critical project and fundamental ontology, itself characterised as a form of transcendental 
philosophy: “transcendental knowledge is a knowledge which investigates the possibility of an 
understanding of being, a pre-ontological understanding of being.  And such an investigation is 
the task of ontology.  Transcendental knowledge is ontological knowledge, i.e.  a priori 
knowledge of the ontological constitution of beings” (GA 25: 186).  Thus Heidegger presents his 
own inquiry into the nature of Being as a way to address the same issue as Kant: “what is asked 
about is Being -- that which determines entities as entities, that on the basis of which entities are 
already understood, however we may discuss them in detail.  The Being of entities ‘is’ not itself 
an entity” (SZ: 6, emphasis supplied).  So Heidegger agrees with Kant on the object of the 
investigation (the determination of entities), and on the idea that the structure of ontological 
determination is not itself ontical.  What remains unclear, however, is the extent to which 
                                                          
1Heidegger’s main writings on Kant are Being and Time, Heidegger’s 1927 course (A 
Phenomenological interpretation of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, GA 25), Kant and the 
Problem of Metaphysics (1929, GA 3) and the section of the Basic Problems of Phenomenology 
(GA 24) devoted to “Kant’s thesis about Being.”  Among the later texts, What is a Thing? (GA 
41) is the most relevant, and recontextualises Heidegger’s reading of Kant within the history of 
Being. 
2 This is also the reason why Heidegger was so opposed to the interpretation of the First 
Critique put forward in his own time by N. Hartmann. This is made particularly clear by GA 25: 
75-6, where Heidegger criticises the three successive “mistakes” (metaphysical, epistemological, 
psychological) made in interpreting Kant.  
Heidegger modifies the Kantian definition of the a priori, and, more generally, whether his 
project of describing the non-ontic structure of our understanding of being is enough to make 
him a transcendental philosopher -- and if so, of which kind.   
 
There are many ways in which this question, central for a paper concerned with Heidegger's 
appropriation (and not merely interpretation) of Kant, can be spelled out.  William Blattner’s 
analysis of the two meanings of the transcendental in Kant is helpful here as a starting point 
(Blattner 1999: 236).  According to him, the idea of a transcendental standpoint can refer to the 
position (which Blattner calls “epistemological”) one occupies when inquiring into the a priori 
conditions for the possibility of knowledge and thus, in the more Heideggerian terms I have used 
so far, into the non-ontic conditions of ontological determinability, But it can also refer to the 
standpoint resulting from the bracketing of these conditions, when one inquires about the nature 
of things regardless of the conditions under which they are disclosed to us (what Blattner calls 
the properly “transcendental” standpoint).  Most commentators, even the ones who, like Hubert 
Dreyfus, don’t see Heidegger as a transcendental philosopher, would probably agree that there is 
a transcendental element in fundamental ontology in the first of these two senses.  Although he 
insists that Dasein cannot be properly understood in a decontextualised, word-less manner, the 
way in which Heidegger spells out the structure of the existentials is transcendental in that it 
requires a shift from the post hoc (beings) to the a priori (Being), and inquires about our 
understanding of being as a set of non causal, non compositional conditions for the determination 
of entities (what Taylor Carman, for example, openly refers to the Allisonian notion of an 
“epistemic condition” and calls “hermeneutic conditions”.  Thus Taylor Carman sees these 
conditions as expanding on Allison’s notion of an “epistemic condition.”  See Allison 1983: 10 
ff.).  However, there is considerable dissent on whether Heidegger can (or should) be understood 
as a transcendental philosopher in the second of the above mentioned senses: Blattner is (to my 
knowledge) the only one who holds that the stronger notion of the transcendental standpoint as a 
bracketing of the epistemological perspective is operative in Heidegger, while others, in 
particular Dreyfus (1991: 253-65), Taylor Carman (2003: 157-203) and David Cerbone (see 
CERBONE) think that the thrust of Heidegger's position lies precisely in refuting the possibility 
(or at least showing the philosophical futility) of such a standpoint.  
 
Similarly, commentators disagree on the question of whether there is anything like 
transcendental determination in Heidegger's work.  Another useful distinction here can be 
borrowed from Mark Sacks, who differenciates between what he calls “transcendental 
constraints” and “transcendental features” (Sacks 2003: 211-8).  The first indicates a 
“dependence of empirical possibilities on a non-empirical structure” (Sacks 2003: 213).  It 
denotes a strong sense of transcendental determination, in which the conditions of such a 
determination are definable in isolation and in anticipation of what they determine (in the way 
the transcendental organisation of the faculties can be spelled out completely independently of 
experience in Kant, and in such a way that experience must conform to them).  Transcendental 
features, on the contrary, “indicate the limitations implicitly determined by a range of available 
practices . . . to which further alternatives cannot be made intelligible to those engaged in them” 
(ibid.).  They refer to a much weaker sense of transcendental determination, as (in Heidegger's 
case) the fact that beings are dependent, to be disclosed, on our having an understanding of 
Being which, while is not ontic, is nevertheless historically situated and thus dependent on ontic 
practices.   Most people, I think, would agree that our having an understanding of Being can be 
construed as a transcendental feature.  However, few would grant that there is anything like a 
transcendental constraint in Heidegger's work -- Blattner being, again, the only one who holds 
this view (by arguing, firstly, that ontology does not depend upon, and is not open to refutation 
and revision by empirical, scientific inquiry, and, secondly, that from the fact that there is an a 
priori connection between Being and temporality, one can infer that entities must have a 
temporal structure).   
 
Thus the really problematic question is not whether Heidegger can be construed as a 
transcendental philosopher in general, but a) whether anything of substantial importance rides on 
his being able to endorse the transcendental standpoint in the strong sense, and b) whether 
fundamental ontology involves anything like a transcendental constraint.  I shall begin with the 
second point, and focus on the problem of transcendental determination (what Heidegger calls 
the “ontological determinability”, or the “constitution of Being” of entities (GA 25: 37).  This, in 
turn, raises a very difficult question: what does Heidegger mean by “entity” (Seiende)? He 
clearly uses the word as a generic term for what there is, without any of the specific connotations 
linked to the notions of “object” (Objekt) (as a mental representation) or “thing” (Ding) (as what 
gathers, in the later work).  But how do entities relate to what he calls the “phenomenon” 
(Phänomen)? In which sense can entities be said to be “phenomena” (phainomena)? In 
particular, by “entity”, should we understand something as it is in itself, independently of the 
conditions of its disclosure, and which we could know independently of such conditions? Or 
does the word “entity” structurally involve a form of ontological determination, in which case it 
would be impossible to dissociate its what-being (as a disclosed entity) from the “how” of its 
disclosure (although as we shall see, it would be wrong to think the former single-handedly 
determined by the latter, as in subjective idealism)? And if such is the case, how does our 
knowledge of entities relate to what is?  
 
The problem is that Being and Time is very ambiguous on this point, and both sides can find 
substantiating quotes.  Thus, while Blattner focuses on the claim that “Being is that which 
determines entities as entities” (SZ: 6, emphasis supplied), Carman is quick to point out that for 
Heidegger “entities are, quite independently of the experience by which they are disclosed, the 
acquaintance in which they are discovered, and the grasping in which their nature is ascertained” 
(SZ: 183).  This ambiguity is partially caused by the fact that Heidegger did not devote any 
section of Being and Time specifically to the problem of the nature of entities, a lack probably 
due to his concern for changing the focus of the tradition and completing metaphysics by shifting 
from the Aristotelian question ti to on to the question of Being (see for example GA 3: 221).  The 
closest candidate, however, is a notoriously difficult passage, “The Concept of Phenomenon” 
(SZ, §7A), which none of the afore-mentioned interpreters has examined in its entirety3.  The 
beginning of the passage provides an ontic definition of the “phenomenon” (Phänomen), as “that 
                                                          
3 Blattner comes the closest, but his exegesis stops before the crucially important notion of 
“mere appearances” is introduced.  The reason for this omission is indirectly given in a footnote 
(1999: 11), which dismisses “mere appearances” as “the somehow products of entities in the 
world”.  Blattner sees this as Heidegger's misreading of “Kant's few remarks about noumenal 
causation of appearances”; as will become apparent, Heidegger's reading of Kant is correct, it is 
Blattner’s (quite understandable) assumption that the passage is referring to noumenal causation 
that is mistaken.   
which shows itself in itself, the manifest” (SZ: 28).  Thus “the ‘phenomena’ are the totality of 
what lies in the light of day or can be brought to the light -- what the Greeks sometimes 
identified simply as ta onta (entities)” (ibid.).  At this stage, it is impossible to draw any 
conclusion about the nature of entities and their relation to Being (the definition just indicates 
that entities are whatever is in the sense of being presenced).  The second meaning of the 
phenomenon, “semblance” (Schein), is also an ontic one: it refers to an entity showing itself “as 
something which it is not”, or “looking like something or other” (ibid.).  Heidegger does not give 
any example, but optical illusions (such as Descartes’ seemingly broken stick) seem to be a 
plausible option (see SZ: 30).  Semblance is structurally dependent on the first signification of 
the phenomenon in the sense that it presupposes the possibility of something being able to show 
itself in itself in the first place -- thus one must be able to see that the stick is not broken (when it 
is removed from the water) to realise that the perception of it as broken is a case of semblance, 
and not just the phenomenon of a broken stick showing itself as it is in itself.  Thus Heidegger 
concludes that the term “phenomenon” should be reserved for the “positive and primordial 
signification of phainomenon” (SZ: 29), i.e. entities, while semblance is just a privative 
modification.  Again, this does not help much per se to clarify the relation of entities to Being, 
although it has important implications for Heidegger's understanding of truth (in the sense that 
without this distinction between the two first meanings of the phenomenon, ontic truth as 
correspondence would not be possible, for we couldn’t ascertain whether an entity is disclosed in 
itself or not).   
 
However, the situation changes with the next two definitions, “appearance” (Erscheinung) and in 
particular “mere appearance” (blosse Erscheinung).  Unexpectedly, because Heidegger 
introduces them by saying that both phenomenon and semblance have “proximally nothing at all 
to do with what is called an appearance, or still less a ‘mere appearance’” (SZ: 29).  However, as 
we shall see the way Heidegger analyses them shows that in fact, they have a lot to do with each 
other, and that this exaggerated warning is mostly motivated by his worry that “the bewildering 
multiplicity of ‘phenomena’ designated by the words ‘phenomenon’, ‘semblance’, ‘appearance’, 
‘mere appearance’ cannot be disentangled” (SZ: 31) unless they are carefully distinguished.  
Heidegger's emphasis that all are “founded upon the phenomenon, although in different ways” 
(SZ: 31) is per se indicative that his warning should not be taken literally.  By contrast with the 
first two cases, in which what is shows itself, respectively as what it is (entities as ontic 
phenomena) are or as what it is not (semblance), appearing is a “not showing itself” (SZ: 29), 
specified as “an announcing itself through something that shows itself” (SZ: 29).  Appearing is a 
way for an entity to indicate its presence, but without revealing itself directly, and therefore 
through the disclosure of another entity -- thus, says Heidegger, measles announces itself through 
spots.  So the spots are, considered in their own right, a phenomenon (they show themselves as 
what they are); but considered with respect to what is hidden and which they indicate (the 
disease), they are an appearance.  As both what “announces itself” (SZ: 30) (the disease) and 
what does the announcing (the spots) are entities, this definition of appearance, like that of 
semblance, is an ontic one: appearance “means a reference-relationship which is in an entity 
itself and which is such that what does the referring . . . can fulfil its possible function only if it 
shows itself and is thus a ‘phenomenon’” (SZ: 31, emphasis supplied).  Consequently (as in the 
case of semblance), the relation between appearances and phenomena is not symmetrical: the 
possibility of there being appearances in the first place rests on the ontic definition of the 
phenomenon as that which shows itself in itself (without which the spots couldn’t be disclosed): 
thus “phenomena are never appearances, though on the other hand every appearance is 
dependent on phenomena” (SZ: 30; strictly speaking, Heidegger should say that considered in 
themselves phenomena are never appearances).   
 
So what is can show itself as what it is (as an entity, a phenomenon in the ontic sense), as what it 
is not (semblance), or not show itself at all and appear through some other entity that indicates it.  
However, there is an even more complex mode of disclosure for entities, introduced as a 
complication of the referring structure of appearance.  In the case of “mere appearances”, “that 
which does the announcing and is brought forth does, of course, show itself, and in such a way 
that, as an emanation of what it announces, it keeps this very thing constantly veiled in itself.  On 
the other hand, this not showing which veils is not a semblance” (SZ: 30).  According to what we 
have just seen, appearances and mere appearances are both phenomena in the ontic sense (they 
“show themselves”); but whereas appearances indicate what announces itself in such a way that 
its presence can be made indirectly manifest (through the reference structure), the indication 
performed by mere appearances is such that what announces itself must structurally remain 
hidden.  Both appearances and mere appearances are referred by Heidegger to Kant in the 
following way: “according to him, appearances are, in the first place, the ‘objects of empirical 
intuition’ . . . .  But what thus shows itself (the ‘phenomenon’ in the genuine primordial sense) is 
at the same time an appearance as an emanation of something which hides itself in that 
appearance” (SZ: 30).  It is difficult to interpret this passage simply from the perspective of 
Being and Time, which remains fairly allusive.  In particular, the temptation is great to read it, as 
Blattner does, in the light of Kant's remarks on noumenal causation, and to identify the 
“something which hides itself” to a thing-in-itself, and ‘mere appearances’ to its manifestation 
(its “emanation” (Ausstrahltung) in the empirical realm.  This, in turn, would suggest that 
Heidegger holds the so-called “two-world” view, according to which things-in-themselves, as 
super-sensible beings, are substantially different from phenomena (in the Kantian sense) 
themselves considered as mental representations which can only obscure the true nature of the 
in-itself.  If such was the case, then the mode of disclosure intrinsic to mere appearances would 
be hopelessly metaphysical (and without any relevance whatsoever to Heidegger's own position 
regarding entities) for three reasons: a) mere appearances (and appearances) would not be 
entities, but subjective representations, b) mere appearances would not refer to entities anymore 
(contrary to appearances in the Heideggerian sense), but to things-in-themselves, and c) the 
objects of the reference structure (i.e.  the things-in-themselves) would be forever beyond our 
reach.   
 
However, both the Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant and Kant and the Problem of 
Metaphysics are helpful in correcting this view.  Heidegger returns twice to the notion of “mere 
appearances” (which indirectly underlines its importance), and makes it clear that both 
appearances and mere appearances are entities, not mental representations: “the general 
discussion of the thing-in-itself and appearances should make clear that appearances mean 
objects or things themselves.  The term mere appearance does not refer to mere subjective 
products to which nothing actual corresponds.  Appearance as appearance or object does not 
need at all still to correspond to something actual, because appearance itself is the actual” (GA 
25: 100).  Throughout the two Kant books, Heidegger is very insistent that one should avoid 
endorsing the two-worlds view of transcendental idealism, which he calls the “grossest 
misunderstanding”: “appearance is also appearance of something -- as Kant puts it: the thing 
itself.  However, in order to eliminate right away the grossest misunderstanding, we must say 
that appearances are not mere illusions, nor are they some kind of free floating emissions from 
things.  Rather appearances are objects themselves, or things”4.  Thus Heidegger's reading of 
Kant anticipates the so-called “deflationary” or “two-aspects” interpretation of transcendental 
idealism put forward by Bird and Allison.5 In doing so, Heidegger opposes stronger 
interpretations of transcendental idealism,6which commit Kant to a substantial definition of the 
thing-in-itself as an intelligible entity, with specific properties which we can think (but not 
know) -- for example, immortality for the soul, or free noumenal agency.7   This clarifies two 
                                                          
4 GA 25: 98.  See also GA 25: 55: “when Kant brings out the Copernican revolution in 
philosophy–when he has the objects hinging on knowledge rather than knowledge hinging on 
objects–this does not mean that real beings are turned upside down in interpretation and get 
resolved into mere subjective representations.”  Guyer’s (1987) attacks on Allison’s position are 
a good representative of the kind of mistake that Heidegger has in mind here.  Guyer grounds his 
criticism of the two-aspect view on the Kantian statement that epistemic conditions, particularly 
space and time, are “merely subjective”, in which case they would be imposed on entities (hence 
the charge of “impositionalism”) and all we would know would be our own mental 
representations of things.  However, while the claim that space and time are “merely subjective” 
denies them transcendental applications, it does not mean that they do not have empirical 
validity, quite on the contrary.  This is the reason why Kant can describe himself as a 
transcendental idealist and an empirical realist.  Another similar criticism is provided by Langton 
2001.  Like Guyer, she assumes that when Kant speaks of space as “ideal”, “subjective” or a 
“mere representation”, he is expressing a kind of phenomenalism (or empirical idealism) about 
space.  But Kant insists on the “objective validity” and “empirical reality” of space (A35-36).   
5 Such a position can be broadly characterised by the two following sets of claims: a) 
transcendental conditions exist, can be analysed a priori and form the framework necessary for 
things to be constituted as phenomena; b) it makes sense, however, to bracket these 
transcendental conditions and to refer to the same things thus considered in themselves, as 
endowed with independent properties which we cannot know, although we are driven by the very 
nature of human reason to think about them.   
6 Heidegger's interpretation of the Critique of Pure Reason, perhaps because it leaves the 
Transcendental Dialectics aside completely, is mostly concerned with Kant's account of the 
conditions of the constitution of phenomena, and very little with the latter’s positive suggestions 
about the nature of things-in-themselves.  Thus Heidegger anticipates more contemporary 
readings, in particular Graham Bird’s and Henry Allison’s, in trying to establish the meaning of 
transcendental idealism exclusively from the First Critique.  There are some differences between 
Heidegger's and Allison’s interpretations of Kant, in particular on the question of the nature of 
self-affection and the status of the “I think” of transcendental apperception; but as none of them 
are relevant to the question of Heidegger's appropriation of Kant, I won’t develop them here. 
7 Such interpretations, such as Karl Ameriks’, argue that it is not desirable to read the Critique of 
Pure Reason in isolation from other works, in particular the Second Critique and the 
Groundwork.  However this is precisely what Heidegger does, with just a fleeting reference to 
the notion of respect in the Critique of Practical Reason (as also dependent on the activity of 
transcendental imagination).  Cf.  GA 3: §30, “Transcendental Imagination and Practical 
points in Being and Time: firstly, it explains why the “not showing which veils” of mere 
appearances is not a semblance.  Semblance refers to an entity showing itself for what it is not (a 
“mere illusion”); mere appearances are entities which show themselves for what they are, but 
which, in doing so, also indicate something else.  Secondly, it suggests that the indication 
performed is very unlikely to refer to noumenal causality (Heidegger says that is not a “free-
floating emission”, a theme that takes up that of “emanation” in Being and Time), in particular 
because of Heidegger's emphasis on the identity between the things-in-themselves and 
appearances: “appearances are also not other things next to or prior to the things themselves.  
Rather appearances are just those things themselves, which we encounter and discover as 
occurrent within the world” (GA 25: 98; see also GA 3: 32).  In fact, Heidegger endorses the 
two-aspect view to such an extent that his commentary of the First Critique leaves entirely out 
the notion of noumenal causality.   
 
So both appearances and mere appearances are entities; however, the nature of what is indicated 
by the latter still remains obscure.  From Heidegger's strong rejection of the two-world view, we 
can infer that it is not the thing-in-itself as an intelligible entity.  We also know that the 
indication is not arbitrary (not “free-floating”), and that what is indicated must, at least prima 
facie, remain hidden by the showing itself of the entity.  Again, Kant and the Problem of 
Metaphysics provides an important clue: “the ‘mere’ in the phrase ‘mere appearance’ is not a 
restricting and diminishing of the actuality of the thing, but is rather only the negation of  the 
assumption  that the entity can be infinitely known in human knowledge” (GA 3: 34).  The 
“mere” is thus an indication of human finitude, by opposition to the infinite knowledge of an 
intuitus originarius, which would not need external input and could produce the thing it knows in 
the purely intuitive act of knowing it.  But what makes us finite, for Heidegger, is the need for 
sensory data and for the synthetising activity of thought, which, in turn, both involve a priori 
conditions (in Kant, time and space as the a priori forms of sensibility and the pure concepts of 
the understanding).  Consequently, it makes sense to think that “mere appearances” do not refer 
to another entity, nor to a thing-in-itself, but to the transcendental framework that all entities, as 
spatio-temporal (or temporal only), must conform to if they are to count for us as entities.  Very 
importantly, this is an ontological form of indication: entities, as mere appearances, structurally 
refer to the transcendental conditions of their disclosure.  Conversely, these are built into them in 
such a way that to be an entity in the sense of a mere appearance is tantamount to being a 
(spatio)-temporal object: since both the a priori forms of sensibility (time and space) and the 
categories (such as causality) are transcendentally involved in the determination of entities, it 
belongs to the very nature of these entities to be spatio-temporal, and to interact causally: Thus, 
“appearances as appearances, as beings so encountered, are themselves spatial and intra 
temporal.  Spatial and temporal determinations belong to that which the encountered being is” 
(GA 25: 156, emphasis supplied).  Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics extends this point to the 
pure concepts of the understanding: these “by means of the pure power of imagination, refer 
essentially to time . . . .  For this reason they are, in advance, determinations of the objects, i.e. of 
the entity insofar as it is encountered by a finite creature” (GA 3: 86, emphasis supplied).  Very 
importantly, another passage generalises this inbuilt reference of entities to their transcendental 
conditions to all appearances: “the expression ‘mere appearances’ indicates the beings which are 
accessible to a finite being.  This is the primary meaning of the Kantian concept of appearance” 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Reason”. 
(GA 25: 100-1, emphasis supplied; the following page indicates that such appearances are 
“things encountered in daily life”, in “prescientific experiential knowledge”).  So for Kant, all 
appearances (i.e.  all entities) are mere appearances in that they both obey and indicate the 
transcendental conditions under which they must be disclosed.   
 
This, in turn, allows Heidegger to uncover in Kant's work a second, ontological meaning for the 
notion of “phenomenon”, distinct from the first ontic sense examined above (that which shows 
itself in itself, i.e.  entities).  He begins by pointing out that there are two ways of thinking of the 
phenomenon, both derived from its original definition as “that which shows itself”: the first one 
is the “formal” or “ordinary” conception, which we arrive at if “by ‘that which shows itself’’ we 
understand those entities which are accessible through ‘empirical intuition’ in . . . Kant's sense” 
(SZ: 31).  This definition refers to mere appearances, and more generally to appearances in the 
Kantian (but not Heideggerian) sense.  However, with the right method of investigation a second 
meaning for the phenomenon can emerge from the first: “we may say that which already shows 
itself in the appearance as prior to the “phenomenon” as ordinarily understood and as 
accompanying it in every case, even it thus shows itself unthematically, can be brought 
thematically to show itself; and what thus shows itself in itself (the forms of intuition) will be the 
phenomena of phenomenology” (SZ: 31, emphasis supplied).  As we have seen, all appearances 
structurally involve (“in every case”) a reference to the spatio-temporal framework which is built 
into them as the entities we can have access to.  This framework (the “forms of intuition”) is 
“prior” to phenomena in the ontic sense because it is presupposed by them as a condition of 
possibility for their disclosure: it is thus an ontological kind of phenomenon.  But contrary to 
these entities, it does not show itself directly (which is the reason why Heidegger said earlier of 
mere appearances that what they indicate “hides itself in that appearance”), and it is not itself an 
entity.  However, it is not irretrievable: “manifestly space and time must be able to show 
themselves in this way  as the phenomena of phenomenology  -- they must be able to become 
phenomena -- if Kant is claiming to make a transcendental assertion grounded in the facts when 
he says that space is the a priori “inside-which” of an ordering” (SZ: 31).  So while phenomena 
of the first order (entities) are directly accessible to us, and do not require any elaboration to be 
understood, the phenomena of phenomenology, i.e.  the transcendental conditions of the 
disclosure of entities, can only become a phenomenon in the first sense (i.e.  show themselves as 
they are) if uncovered by a specific method, phenomenology.  Correlatively, the latter must, 
because of the nature of its object, be defined as a transcendental form of inquiry which traces 
entities to their ontological conditions of possibility: in doing so, phenomenology discloses the 
way(s) in which ontic phenomena are constituted.  It is very important, however, to understand 
such a constitution as transcendental and to distinguish it carefully from any causal process: both 
Heidegger and Kant are very clear that we do not create the entities which we access (this would 
only be the case if we were infinite beings); nor are the properties disclosed arbitrarily attributed 
to them.  In fact, neither the mode of disclosure nor the properties are up to us, since we do not 
choose our framework, and we do not decide whether what is can or cannot be determined by it, 
a point to which I’ll get back to in conclusion.   
 
A careful reading of §7 thus uncovers two meanings, both for appearances and for the 
phenomenon.  At the ontic level, phenomena are entities, and appearances are entities that refer 
to other entities, which appear through them (like measles does through spots).  At the 
ontological level, all appearances should be seen as “mere appearances” in that they refer to the 
transcendental conditions that a finite entity like Dasein needs to be able to access anything.  
Correlatively, the phenomenon in the ontological sense is identified with these conditions, which 
are hidden by the entities themselves and can only become accessible to the phenomenologist.  
This means that while all entities are phenomena (in the first sense) and structurally involve the 
phenomenon (in the ontological sense), not all phenomena are entities (since the transcendental 
framework is not ontic).  Phenomenality is a condition of possibility for entityhood, but not the 
reverse, which is the reason why (as Blattner insists) phenomenology is not a primarily a theory 
of perception.  However, so far the ontological meaning of appearances and phenomenon has 
been established only within the context of Kant's work.  What I want to suggest now is that 
while appearances in the Heideggerian sense are a very limited case of ontic reference (partially 
taken up in the later analysis of the kind of indication performed by signs and symbols, SZ: 77-
83), mere appearances analogically provide us with a way to understand how Heidegger, and not 
only Kant, thinks of entities as structurally involving a reference to Being as both their condition 
of intelligibility and thus of existence as entities.  I’ll try to establish this point before outlining 
the limits of the analogy and its consequences on the debate about realism.   
 
In my view, the key to the analogy is given by the final section of §7, i.e.  “The Preliminary 
Conception of Phenomenology”, where Heidegger expresses his own views about the nature of 
phenomena and entities.  Just as in his analysis of Kant, he starts with the ontic meaning of the 
phenomenon: “the expression ‘phenomenology’ may be formulated in Greek as legein ta 
phainomena, where legein means apophainesthai.  Thus ‘phenomenology’ means 
apophainesthai ta phainomena” (SZ: 34).  Because it deals with phenomena in the formal sense 
(i.e., as entities, cf supra), Heidegger calls this the “formal” meaning of phenomenology, which 
he sees encapsulated in the Husserlian formula “back to the things themselves!” (i.e.  back to 
entities, as opposed to things-in-themselves).  Thus, “the signification of ‘phenomenon’, as 
conceived both formally and in the ordinary manner, is such that any exhibiting of an entity as it 
shows itself in itself, may be called ‘phenomenology’ with formal justification” (SZ: 35).  
However, such a conception, both of phenomenology and of the phenomenon, must be 
“deformalised”, hence the question: “what is it that must be called a ‘phenomenon’ in a 
distinctive sense?” (SZ: 35).  Heidegger's answer is that “that which remains hidden in an 
egregious sense . . . is not just this entity or that, but rather the Being of entities” (SZ: 35).  Thus 
“in the phenomenological  i.e.  ontological  conception of the phenomenon what one has in mind 
as that which shows itself is the Being of entities, its meaning, its modifications and its 
derivatives” (SZ: 35).  However, the crucial point here is that this definition of the 
phenomenological understanding of the phenomenon is, structurally at least, strikingly identical 
to the ontological definition of the phenomenon in Heidegger's reading of Kant.  Indeed, 
Heidegger indicates that “manifestly,  Being  is something that proximally and for the most part 
does not show itself at all: it is something that lies hidden, in contrast to that which proximally 
and for the most part does show itself; but at the same time it is something that belongs to what 
thus shows itself, and it belongs to it so essentially as to constitute its meaning and its ground” 
(SZ: 35, emphasis supplied).   Just as time and space, the transcendental forms of intuition, 
“hide” in Kantian appearances, Being, the phenomenon of phenomenology “lies hidden” within 
entities (i.e.  “that which shows itself”, the ontic definition of the phenomenon).  At this point, 
Heidegger even mentions explicitly (and rejects) vis-Β-vis Being the possibility which he 
previously refuted in the case of mere appearances, i.e.  the idea that “the Being of entities  could  
ever be anything such that “behind it” stands something else ‘which does not appear’” (SZ: 36), 
i.e.  a thing-in-itself.  On the contrary, both the Kantian forms of intuition and Being “belong to 
what thus shows itself”, not as a property, but as what “constitutes its meaning and its ground”, 
i.e.  as what allows what is to be determined as intelligible (for Heidegger) or cognisable (for 
Kant), and therefore as an entity (or as a phenomenon in the Kantian sense).  In both cases, such 
a transcendental form of constitution is seen as necessary : thus the phenomenon of 
phenomenology is something which “by its very essence is necessarily the theme whenever we 
exhibit something explicitly  i.e.  when we shift from the ordinary mode of disclosure to the 
phenomenological one ” (SZ: 35).   
 
The correlate of this is that the conditions of transcendental determination must be reflected, in a 
way that can be transcendentally clarified, by the ontological structure of entities: as we have 
seen, according to Kant one can analytically infer from the fact that time and space are a priori 
forms of sensibility that phenomena are spatio-temporal.  In §7, the fact that Being is bound-up 
with the structure of entities as ontic phenomena (it “lies hidden” within them) is suggested by 
the claim that it is necessary to start from the entities themselves in order to exhibit the 
phenomenon in the ontological sense as what is, in each case, their being: “while phenomena  in 
the ontological sense , as understood phenomenologically, are never anything but what goes to 
make up Being, while Being is in every case the Being of some entity, we must first bring 
forward the entities themselves if it is our aim that Being should be laid bare” (SZ: 37, emphasis 
supplied).  Later in the text, Heidegger makes a similar point about the relation of world 
(understood ontologically) to entities: “what can be meant by describing the ‘world’ as a 
phenomenon? It means to let us see what shows itself in “entities” within the world” (SZ: 63; 
note Heidegger’s use of scare quotes).  Conversely, “entities must likewise show themselves 
with the kind of access which genuinely belongs to them” (SZ: 37, emphasis supplied).  For such 
a “belonging” to be “genuine”, or for the being of each entity to be “its” being, access must be 
impossible to dissociate from the very concept of the entity considered.  In turn, this suggests 
that there is an internal relationship between entities and being, which makes it impossible to 
separate their what-being as entities from the how of their disclosure.  This relationship is the 
transcendental determination performed by Dasein.  In the final part of Kant and the Problem of 
Metaphysics, where he defines his enterprise as a “retrieval” (GA 3: 208) of the Kantian project, 
Heidegger strongly reasserts that ontological determination must be understood in its intrinsic 
connection with the nature of entities as entities, and gives some indications as to its nature:  
in the question as to what the entity as such might be, we have asked what generally 
determines the entity as an entity.  We call it the Being of the entity . . . .  This 
determining should be known in the How of its determining . . . .  In order to be able to 
grasp the essential determinacy of the entity through Being, however, the determining 
itself must be sufficiently comprehensible (GA 3: 222-3, emphasis supplied; see also GA 
3: 283, where Heidegger speaks of the “transcendence of man” as a “formative 
comporting towards entities,” emphasis supplied). 
A few pages later, Heidegger specifies how this “determining” should be seen by stating that 
the existential analytic of everydayness . . . should show that and how all association with 
entities, even where it appears as if there were just entities  i.e.  even where entities seem 
to be independent from our “association” with (or, in terms used so far, access to) them , 
already presupposes the transcendence of Dasein -- namely, being-in-the-world.  With it, 
the projection of the Being of the entity, although concealed and for the most part 
indeterminate, takes place” (GA 3: 235, some emphasis supplied).   
This allows us to understand better the kind of transcendental determination that is specific both 
to Dasein and to entities.  Indeed, for Heidegger, the idea of a “projection” of Being as the 
horizon of ontological determination is an analogical transposition of the opening of the pure 
horizon of temporality by the schematising activity of transcendental imagination in Kant's work.  
In the same way, temporality is understood by Heidegger himself as the “transcendental primal 
structure” that underlies both care and being-in-the-world (GA 3: 242; Blattner has shown that 
this is already the case in Being and Time).  As we shall see below, this means that, as suggested 
by Blattner, all entities are a priori determined as temporal.   
 
There are, of course, limits to the analogy between Kant and Heidegger, most of which were 
identified by Heidegger himself.  Firstly, in focusing the search for the conditions of ontological 
determinability on the transcendental subject as a detached, disembodied ego, Kant chose the 
wrong starting point.  He remained trapped within the Cartesian understanding of the subject as a 
thinking substance, which led him to think of Dasein as a worldless entity, an occurrent 
compound of body and soul (GA 25: 160-1).  This is why Kant was able to provide, at best, a 
regional ontology of the occurrent (because he failed to replace theoretical cognition within the 
wider context of understanding as grounded in our everyday practices)(see for example GA 25: 
199).  Thus,  
the fundamental and crucial deficiency in Kant's posing of the problem of the categories 
in general lies in misconstruing the problem of transcendence -- or better said, in failing 
to see transcendence as an original and essential determination of the ontological 
constitution of Dasein.  Insofar as it factually exists, Dasein is precisely not an isolated 
subject, but a being which is fundamentally outside of itself (GA 25: 315).   
This failure to understand the ecstatic nature of Dasein as being-in-the-world explains Kant's 
second shortcoming, i.e.  his shrinking back from his own insight into the temporally projective 
nature of transcendental imagination as the “common root” between the pure forms of sensibility 
(time and space) and the pure concepts of the understanding (the categories).  According to 
Heidegger, in the A edition of the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant did recognise the properly 
synthetic role played by transcendental imagination, and established that both the a priori forms 
of sensibility and the “I think” of transcendental apperception are dependent on its syntheses: 
thus, “the origin of pure intuition and pure thinking as transcendental faculties  is  shown to be 
based on the transcendental power of imagination” (GA 3: 138).  Consequently, Kant defined 
time as pure self-affection, and spelled out the connection between the three imaginative 
syntheses (apprehension, reproduction and recognition) and the three dimensions of temporality 
(respectively, present, past and future) (see GA 25: §20-24.  On time as self-affection, see GA 
25: 386-99; on the three syntheses, 403-24).  But although he glimpsed the horizontal nature of 
temporality and thus came close to uncovering the constitutive link between time and being, 
Kant “shrank back” from his own intuition, and demoted imagination to being a purely empirical 
faculty in the B edition.8  Thus he “looked on imagination as the dimension of human Dasein . . . 
, only to be scared away from it” (GA 25: 279).  However, it is crucial to note that these 
limitations do not affect the reading of Heidegger that I have suggested.  Heidegger does not 
criticise Kant for claiming that entities are transcendentally determined (as spatio-temporal): on 
                                                          
8Heidegger thinks that part of the reason for this lies in Kant's remaining influenced by the 
scholastic division of the faculties, and the need to reinforce the traditional prevalence of the 
understanding over both sensibility and imagination. 
the contrary, he blames him for not developing the idea of transcendental determination far 
enough, and in particular for not having seen (or rather having “shrunk back” from the idea) that 
temporality is not only an a priori form of sensibility, but also underlies the “I think” of 
transcendental apperception and the syntheses of transcendental imagination.  Heidegger does 
not question the claim that entities get their “essential determinacy” through being, and thus that 
they must not be dissociated from the transcendental framework that determines them.  On the 
contrary, he establishes that temporality underlies that framework at all levels, not only as far as 
occurrentness is concerned.  The consequence of this is that although no empirical property can 
be ascribed in advance to entities, all entities are a priori determined by Dasein as temporal.  Just 
as, on Heidegger's dual-aspect reading of Kant, we can analytically infer, from the fact that time 
and space are a priori forms of sensibility, that phenomena are spatio-temporal, in the same way 
we can infer from the fact that temporality underlies the structure of being-in-the-world and of 
care that entities are temporal (although one cannot infer any such thing about what is 
independently of the conditions of transcendental determination).   
 
This has important consequences, however, on the existing debate about Heidegger's realism.  
On the one hand, some commentators, like Dreyfus, hold that “Heidegger never concluded from 
the fact that our practices are necessary for access to theoretical entities that these entities must 
be defined in terms of our access practices” (Dreyfus 1991: 253).  This position was recently 
radicalised by Carman, who reads Heidegger as an “ontic realist”, ontic realism being “the claim 
that occurrent entities exist and have a determinate spatio-temporal structure independently of us 
and our understanding of them” (2003: 157).  Both these options associate two positions: 
ontological realism (there is a way entities are in themselves) and epistemological realism (we 
can know them as they are in themselves).  On the other hand others, like Blattner, think that 
Heidegger is a transcendental (or temporal) idealist, do so on the opposite assumption that 
entities (like phenomena for Kant) cannot be defined as such independently of the conditions of 
their disclosure: thus, “Being determines entities by making up the criterial standards to which 
entities (or aspects of what is) must conform in order to be entities at all.  Being is a framework 
of items without which entities would not be entities” (Blattner 1999: 5, emphasis supplied).  On 
the strength of this strong definition of transcendental determination, Blattner attributes to 
Heidegger a position broadly similar to Kant's9, namely a combination of transcendental 
idealism and ontic realism, where ontic realism has a very different meaning from the one 
suggested by Carman as it combines a limited form of epistemological realism (we can know 
phenomena/entities as they are at the empirical level/from Dasein’s perspective) with the idealist 
epistemic claim that we cannot know things as they are in themselves, i.e.  from the 
transcendental (in the strong sense) standpoint10.   
 
                                                          
9 Similar but not identical, because Blattner thinks that Kant is an ontic idealist (Blattner 1999: 
245, footnote 25).  Much as I sympathise with Blattner’s views in general, I disagree on this 
particular point, which is also strongly denied by Heidegger’s own reading of Kant.   
10 Hence Blattner analysis of SZ: 212, and his rejection of what he calls the “weak” 
interpretation of the passage, according to which the contrast between “now” and “then” should 
be seen as merely ontic, opposing two empirical possibilities (Dasein’s existence versus a time 
when there would have been no Dasein).   
Both the Kant books and Being and Time, §7 suggest that Blattner is right.  In particular, the idea 
that entities get their “essential determinacy” through being, and this, a priori, tends to invalidate 
the claim, put forward by Carman, that “although  Heidegger  maintains that cognition is 
founded on being in, and that occurrent reality is interpretable for us only against the horizon of 
our own worldliness . . . , occurrent entities themselves nevertheless do not depend on being-in-
the-world” (Carman 2003: 134).  The main argument offered is that if such was not the case, 
then Dasein’s naςve realism would be unjustified11.  But as we have seen, entities depends on 
being-in-the-world, not in the sense that they are created by Dasein, or that Dasein attributes to 
them arbitrary properties, but because they are a priori determined as temporal entities.  This 
does not mean that what is as such depends on being-in-the-world (otherwise Heidegger would 
be committed to a form of subjective idealism), but that so long as it is determined by our 
framework of intelligibility and is disclosed as entities, the nature of these entities is bound-up 
with their mode of disclosure.  Therefore the claim that “ Heidegger  takes occurrent entities to 
exist and have a determinate causal structure independently of the conditions of our interpreting 
or making sense of them” (Carman 2003: 159) is inconsistent: occurrent entities can only be 
occurrent if they are ontologically determined as entities by Dasein.  Similarly, their having a 
causal structure is due to the fact that causality is, as Carman puts it himself (in rather Kantian 
terms), an “ontological category”, an “a priori category of the understanding,  the  content  of 
which  is precisely the content of Dasein’s naςve realism about objects as existing independently 
of us and our understanding” (Carman 2003: 136).  In his (legitimate) concern to avoid 
subjective idealism, Carman commits Heidegger to a form of pre-critical realism (equally 
suggested by his claim that “contrary to Kant’s prohibition, there is no good reason to deny that 
we can do have knowledge of things as they are in themselves,” Carman 2003: 159).  This is not 
to say that Heidegger is not a realist -- he is, but not of the kind suggested by Carman.  He is an 
ontic realist in the critical, Kantian sense suggested (but not fully developed) by Blattner: he 
does think that we can know entities as they are, but not independently of their mode of access.  
Whether it is possible for us to know more than this is the question that I now shall turn to.   
 
To answer it, we need to ascertain the extent to which Heidegger is committed to the theoretical 
correlate of transcendental determination, i.e.  the Kantian idea that one must distinguish 
between phenomena and things-in-themselves, and that the latter are unknowable.  This, in turn, 
involves finding out exactly how much of transcendental idealism Heidegger endorses and, in 
particular, whether and how the idea of a transcendental standpoint makes sense in the context of 
his work.  In answer to this question, I shall try to establish two sets of claims: firstly, that per se, 
Heidegger's commitment to the notion of transcendental determination does entail two theses 
that are central to the deflationary interpretation of transcendental idealism outlined above: a) 
                                                          
11 It should become clear in the course of this paper that the version of realism I suggest also 
supports Dasein’s “naςve realism”.  It is also perhaps worth noting that one of the reasons for 
Carman’s rejection of the strong notion of transcendental determination, which results in his 
endorsement of a pre-critical notion of realism, is that his reading of Kant inclines towards the 
two-world view that Heidegger himself rejected.  Thus, “Kant often sounds like a realist in 
another sense, of course, inasmuch as he seems to regard things-in-themselves as constituents of 
some kind of ultimate reality that exists independently of human cognition, notwithstanding the 
fact that “reality” and “existence” are themselves mere categories of the understanding  which is 
tantamount to accusing Kant of being a metaphysical realist ” (Carman 2003: 156).   
that there must also be a way in which things are in themselves, independently of us and of the 
kind of determination we perform, and thus that it makes sense to speak of the transcendental 
standpoint in the strong sense, and b) that such things are not substantially different from the 
entities which are accessible to us, but are the same things, considered under different aspects.  I 
will suggest that Heidegger's name for things considered in this way is the “Real” (das Reale).  
Secondly, that this position commits Heidegger neither to the notion of a thing-in-itself in the 
strong sense (which he explicitly rejects, cf.  GA 25: 98-99), nor, more polemically, to the idea 
that we cannot know what is (although we cannot know it as it is, i.e.  from a God’s eye 
perspective).  While the first is consistent with the deflationary reading of transcendental 
idealism, the second is not, as Allison, following Kant, insists on the non-spatiality and non-
temporality of things-in-themselves, a point I shall discuss later on with reference to Heidegger.   
 
The first two theses have already been touched upon in the course of this paper.  They are 
explicitly stated by Heidegger with reference to Kant, as both the Kant books aim at establishing 
that the difference between an appearance and a thing-in-itself, although real, is not a difference 
in kind, but one of perspective.  Thus, “the entity ‘in the appearance’ is the same entity as the 
entity in itself, and this alone” (GA 3: 31).  But while all appearances are by definition 
cognisable by us,  
what remains closed off to us is the thing itself insofar as it is thought as object of an 
absolute knowledge, i.e.  as object of an intuition which does not first need the interaction 
with the thing and does not first let the thing be encountered, but rather lets the thing first 
of all become what the thing is through this intuition (GA 25: 98). 
To understand the difference between phenomena and things-in-themselves, then, one must 
differenciate between two modes of cognition, not two sorts of entities: on the one hand, “divine 
knowing” as a “representing which, in intuiting, first creates the intuitable being as such,” and 
therefore does not bear “the mark of finitude” (GA 3: 24) as it is bounded neither by a pre-
existing thing nor by the need to access it through sensibility and thought.  On the other hand, 
“finite knowledge”, which perforce must “let the thing be encountered”, i.e.  received through 
the a priori forms of sensibility and synthesised through the activity of imagination and 
judgment.  Thus, the thrust of Heidegger's argument about Kant is that “a discussion of the 
difference between finite and infinite knowledge with a view to the difference in character 
between what is known in each respectively now points out that these concepts of appearance 
and thing-in-itself, which are fundamental for the Critique, can only be made understandable and 
part of the wider problem by basing them more explicitly on the problematic of the finitude of the 
human creature” (GA 3: 35, emphasis supplied).   
 
This, however, has a crucially important consequence: although Heidegger and Kant do not 
understand finitude in the same way (for the reasons mentioned above), they both agree on the 
idea that the defining feature of Dasein (or human beings, for Kant) is their finitude: the main 
difference is that whereas for Kant the hallmark of finitude is the need for the conjoined 
operations of sensibility and thought, for Heidegger it is Dasein’s “transcendental neediness” for 
an understanding of Being (GA 3: 236), and the fact that this understanding is constitutively 
covered up in forgetfulness (GA 3: 233, see also 234).  It follows that Heidegger's very 
grounding of the distinction between things as they are and things as they are disclosed to us in 
the notion of finitude requires him, analytically, to extend the distinction to his own position:  
in truth, however, the essence of finitude inevitably forces us to the question concerning 
the conditions of the possibility of a preliminary Being-oriented toward the Object, i.e., 
concerning the essence of the necessary ontological turning-toward the object in general 
(GA 3: 73),  
i.e., in Heidegger's thought, to a consideration of temporality as underlying care as the 
“transcendental unity of finitude” (GA 3: 237).  As finite beings, we cannot be in the world 
unless we transcendentally determine entities as temporal.  However, there is no reason to think 
that such a determination is the only possible one, nor that it would apply to what is if our 
transcendental conditions were bracketed.  Correlatively, we are required to accept that 
transcendental determination is also dependent on external conditions:  
we can say negatively: finite knowledge is non creative intuition.  What has to be 
presented immediately in its particularity must already have been “at hand” in advance.  
Finite intuition sees that it is dependent on the intuitable as something which exists in its 
own right (GA 3: 25).   
Another passage states that finite knowledge is “confronted” with and is a “conforming” (GA 3: 
31) to what is already there.  The notion of “conformity” is a very important one as it prevents 
Heidegger's position from turning into subjective idealism.  What is must conform to the 
conditions of transcendental determination to be disclosed as entities; but conversely, such 
conformity is not something that can be determined solely by these conditions.  It is very 
important to note, however, that this does not mean that transcendental determination works 
(either in Kant or in Heidegger), by imposing form on some pre-existing matter.  Because we are 
thrown, entities are always already determined by us, there is no pure matter to which we could 
first relate and then shape (this is the background of Kant’s rejection of atomism, and of 
Heidegger’s refutation of skepticism about the existence of the external world). 
 
However, there is an important difference between Heidegger and Kant here: although both are 
committed by their insistence on the finitude of Dasein to the distinction between the two 
standpoints, empirical and transcendental, it does not follow that they must have the same 
understanding of the transcendental standpoint (and consequently, of the nature of things 
considered in themselves).  The reason why they differ is that contrary to Kant, Heidegger does 
not believe in the existence of God nor, consequently, in the possibility of infinite knowledge: 
thus, 
along with the assumption of an absolute intuition, which first produces things . . . , the 
concept of a thing-in-itself also dies away.  . . .  One denies the philosophical legitimacy 
and usefulness of such an assumption, which not only does not contribute to our 
enlightenment but also confuses us, as it becomes clear in Kant (GA 25: 99-100).   
This means that the transcendental standpoint cannot be identified anymore with the perspective 
of a “representing God” (GA 25: 99), for whom the cognition and the creation of things would be 
one and single operation.  However, what it does not mean is that one should drop the notion of a 
transcendental standpoint altogether.  For one thing, we have seen that Heidegger's analysis of 
finitude suggests that it is analytically entailed by the notion of ontological determination.  
Moreover, the relevance of the transcendental standpoint to Heidegger's own thought has been 
established by Blattner’s analysis of Being and Time (SZ: 211-12; see Blattner 1999: 240-51), 
which shows that it should not be seen as the perspective of a “deus faber” (GA 25: 99), but as 
the bracketing of the conditions under which transcendental determination operate (namely, 
Dasein’s projective understanding of time).  In response to Cerbone’s objection, this bracketing 
does not need to be thought of as an existential possibility for Dasein: this would be tantamount 
to requiring that Dasein should be able to occupy the transcendental standpoint, which is 
excluded by definition (since that standpoint only obtains when Dasein’s perspective does not 
apply) (see CERBONE).  The bracketing of transcendental conditions can only be a logical 
possibility, analytically entailed by the notion of transcendental determination itself12.  However, 
even as such, it is not without any value (in answer to Carman’s comment that Heidegger would 
be “pointing out the vacuity and futility of all efforts to stake out a distinct transcendental 
standpoint,” see Carman 2003: 171).  Although it cannot fulfil any positive epistemological 
function (as it prevents by definition the formation of any synthetic knowledge), such a 
bracketing has an important ethical role to play: it can counterbalance what Heidegger calls our 
tendency to be “constantly under the domination of an absolutisation of our finitude” (GA 25: 
159), i.e.  to fall into the trap of metaphysical realism and to believe that our knowledge is, not 
only of entities, but also of things considered in themselves -- this has important consequences, 
to which I shall come back in conclusion.   
 
The claim that the transcendental standpoint should be defined, not as that of a divine intellect 
but as a bracketing of transcendental (in the weak sense) conditions is precisely the position 
defended by Henry Allison.  Thus, “the task of a transcendental justification of the concept of the 
thing-in-itself . . . is to explain the possibility and significance of considering “as they are in 
themselves” the same objects which can know only as they appear; it is not, at is frequently 
assumed, to license appeal to a set of unknown entities distinct from appearances” (Allison 1983: 
239).  According to him, this entails the important consequence that things-in-themselves should 
not be thought of substantively, as intelligible entities, but problematically, as the “logical 
correlates of a non sensible manner of cognition” (Allison 1983: 242).  Thus Allison argues for 
the identification of the thing-in-itself with the transcendental object (suggested by Kant himself 
in A366), as the “correlate of the unity of apperception” (A250), or “something in general = X” 
(A346/B449), i.e.  an object considered apart from the sensible conditions under which things 
can be intuited by the human mind.  Another passage from Kant explains why the notion is 
important, and further identifies the transcendental object with the noumenon understood in its 
negative sense: “in the process of warning  sensibility  that it must not presume to claim 
applicability to thing-in-itself but only to appearances,  the understanding  does indeed think for 
itself an object in itself, but only as a transcendental object . . . , which can be thought neither as 
quantity nor as reality nor a substance, etc . . .  If we are pleased to name this object ‘noumenon’ 
for the reason that its representation is not sensible, we are free to do so” (A288-89/B344-45).  
Very interestingly, Heidegger too refers to the transcendental object in the Metaphysical 
Foundations of Logic, in order to distinguish it from the substantive concept of the thing-in-
itself.  He returns to the question of the usefulness of the concept of a thing-in-itself and indicates 
that it “cannot be set aside by solving it epistemologically, but  that  this concept . . . can only be 
removed if one can show that the presupposition of an absolute understanding is not 
philosophically necessary” (GA 26: 164).  The reason why such a removal cannot be 
“epistemologically” justified is that there is no contradiction in thinking of what is either as 
determined by transcendental conditions, or independently of such conditions.  As we have seen, 
the denial of the thing-in-itself as the correlate of divine cognition is tied to Heidegger's rejection 
                                                          
12 This is the basis of Allison’s “semantic reading” of Kant, which argues that there is a logical 
implication between the consideration of something as an appearance and the possibility of 
considering the same thing in itself.   
of Kant's implicit theology.  However, he also points out that such a rejection does not have any 
consequence on the possibility of thinking what is from the transcendental standpoint (as a 
bracketing of epistemic conditions): “proceeding from appearance, one can show the “X” 
immanent in it qua thing-in-itself, which is not, however, the “thing-in-itself” in the strict sense  
i.e.  as the correlate of divine understanding ” (GA 26: 164).  Thus although the positive concept 
of a thing-in-itself requires additional theological assumptions, that of the transcendental object 
does not: it is analytically entailed by the notion of appearance as the object of finite cognition.   
 
Allison’s interpretation has come under much criticism, in particular from K.  Ameriks13 and R.  
Pippin (see Pippin 1982: 200 ff.), who attacked it on the grounds that it dilutes the meaning of 
transcendental idealism to such an extent that the concept would apply to any alternative to 
transcendental realism which endorses an equivalent to transcendental determination (in 
particular, constructivist views of language).  However, although this is a worry for an 
interpretation of Kant, it is not so for the kind of reading of Heidegger I suggest, since I never 
claimed that Heidegger endorses Kantian transcendental idealism as such, only that his position 
is most of the time (but not always) analogous to it.  Indeed, I now would like to turn to my 
second hypothesis, namely the idea that Being and Time involves an analogon of the noumenon 
as a negative concept, although there is nothing in it that could be read as a thing-in-itself in the 
strong sense.  Heidegger introduces the “Real” by contrasting it with “reality” (Realität).  He 
indicates that “the term “Reality” is meant to stand for the Being of entities present-at-hand 
within the world (res)” (SZ: 209; see also SZ: 183): reality is thus the mode of being of occurrent 
entities.  However, Heidegger adds that “entities within-the-world are ontologically conceivable 
only if the phenomenon of within-the-worldness has been clarified” (SZ: 209).  This, in turn, 
requires an analysis of being-in-the-world and ultimately of care as the “structural totality of 
Dasein’s being” (SZ: 209) -- another passage indicates that “in the order of the ways in which 
things are connected in their ontological foundations . . . , reality is referred back to the 
phenomenon of care” (SZ: 211).  As we have seen, this means that all entities are 
transcendentally determined as temporal.  Heidegger thus concludes that he has “marked out the 
foundations and horizons which must be clarified if an analysis of reality is to be possible” and, 
importantly, that “only in this connection, moreover, does the character of the “in itself” become 
ontologically intelligible” (SZ: 209, emphasis supplied).  This idea is clarified two pages later by 
the following claim: “but the fact that reality is ontologically grounded in the Being of Dasein, 
does not signify that only when Dasein exists and as long as Dasein exists, can the Real be as 
that which in itself is” (SZ: 212).  This suggests that while reality, as a mode of being, is 
dependent on care and thus on transcendental determination, the Real refers to what is “in-itself”, 
i.e.  independently of care, which confers on it a position analogical to that of the noumenon, as 
“a thing insofar as it is not an object of our sensible intuition” (B307).  Following on the analogy 
with the two aspects view examined so far, one would expect Heidegger to say that the real is not 
substantially different from entities, but that it is determined as entities by Dasein.  As it 
happens, this is exactly what Heidegger says: “the Real is essentially accessible only as entities 
                                                          
13 Ameriks points out the “substantive character of things-in-themselves with non spatio-
temporal characteristics”.  Allison’s response to him (1996: 20) is that the intelligible objects 
referred to by Kant are the ideas of pure reason, not things-in-themselves.  While the notion is 
central to the “Transcendental Dialectics”, this metaphysical account should not be used within 
the context of the “Analytic of Principles”.   
within-the-world  which does suggest that the Real, considered in itself, i.e.  independently of 
transcendental conditions is not entities .  All access to such entities is founded ontologically 
upon the basic state of Dasein, being-in-the-world; and this in turn has care as its even more 
primordial state of Being” (SZ: 202, emphasis supplied).   
 
Heidegger differs from Kant in that he distinguishes several ways in which the Real can be 
accessed, and thus asks a question which Kant himself could not have asked : “and finally we 
must make sure what kind of primary access we have to the Real, by deciding the question of 
whether knowing can take over this function at all  as opposed to more primordial non 
theoretical, practically engaged forms of understanding ” (SZ: 202).  But just like Kant, 
Heidegger rejects the claim that the Real could be known it itself, independently of its 
ontological determination into entities.  This is made clear by his refutation of Dilthey’s position, 
which follows his analysis of reality: “to be sure, the Reality of the Real can be characterised 
phenomenologically within certain limits without an explicit existential-ontological basis.  This 
is what Dilthey attempted in the article mentioned above.  He holds that the Real gets 
experienced in impulse and will, and that Reality is resistance, or, more exactly, the character of 
resisting.  He then works out the phenomenon of resistance analytically” (SZ: 209).  The 
example of resistance is interesting because it was already used by Schopenhauer with the same 
aim in mind, namely to try to identify positively the thing-in-itself as will (an identification that 
both Kant and Heidegger reject).  Against this possibility, Heidegger argues that it is impossible 
to attribute the property of resisting to the Real as such, since resistance can only be experienced 
on the background of the disclosure of the world, which by definition precludes it from applying 
to the Real.  Thus “the experiencing of resistance . . .  is possible ontologically only by reason of 
the disclosedness of the world.  The character of resisting is one that belongs to entities within-
the-world” (SZ: 210, emphasis supplied).  Therefore the Real cannot be defined as what resists 
but only negatively, as the correlate of the transcendental standpoint in the strong sense (i.e.  the 
bracketing of our understanding of Being). 
 
I hope that I have now clarified the extent to which early Heidegger appropriates Kant's thought 
in both the Kant books and in Being and Time, §7.  The analysis of the ontological reference 
structurally performed by “mere appearances”, and of the way in which Heidegger extends it to 
his own thought, show that any pre-critical form of epistemological realism (i.e.: things could be 
known as they are independently of our mode of access to them) must be rejected, although a 
critical form of realism (we can know all entities as they are, but what they are as entities cannot 
be dissociated from the transcendental perspective which is the only one possible for us) is 
perfectly acceptable14.  Heidegger “retrieves” Kant's project by showing that entities are 
                                                          
14 There are some passages, in particular in the Metaphysical Foundations of Logic, which resist 
this interpretation and tend to support a more naςve view of realism by suggesting that entities 
are what they are independently of whether we access them or not.  See for example GA 26: 194-
5, where Heidegger asserts that “beings are in themselves the kinds of beings they are, and in the 
way they are, even if, for example, Dasein does not exist”.  However, Heidegger continues in the 
following way: “only insofar as existing Dasein gives itself anything like being can beings 
emerge in their in-themselves, i.e., can the first claim likewise be understood at all and be taken 
into account.”  This suggests to me that the first claim (“beings are in themselves the kinds of 
beings they are”) is implicitly made from the empirical standpoint, from which indeed what 
neither beings’ existence nor what they are is dependent on Dasein.  However, the seemingly 
ontologically determined as temporal by Dasein, and therefore cannot be considered as such 
independently from it.  As we have seen, it does not follow from this that Heidegger is a 
subjective idealist (and neither is Kant).  Moreover, the dual claims that the need for ontological 
determination is definitive of Dasein’s finitude, and that the latter is inescapable, entail that 
although for us there is nothing but entities, we are not entitled to universalise the kind of 
transcendental determination we perform and think that it is the only possible one.  Therefore, 
the possibility of bracketing our transcendental conditions and of referring to what is in itself (the 
Real) must be allowed, although such a reference must remain purely negative, and such a 
bracketing cannot by definition be performed by Dasein itself.  Yet its logical possibility is 
essential to prevent the “absolutisation” of our finitude.  For Kant, such an absolutisation is due 
to reason’s forgetfulness of its limitations (the need for sensory input) and thus to its driving 
“desire” (A796/B824) to overstep the boundaries of experience (which generates the illusions 
analysed in the “Transcendental Dialectics”).  In my view, there is an analogical element in 
Heidegger's thought, which is falling (Verfallen): as a “primal metaphysical factum in Dasein” 
(GA 3: 233), falling is a structural feature of Dasein, and cannot be avoided.  Kant and the 
Problem of Metaphysics defines it as our inescapable tendency to forget that we need (and have) 
an understanding of Being, a forgetfulness which is “nothing accidental or temporary, but on the 
contrary is necessarily and constantly formed”15.  Such a forgetfulness is tantamount to 
forgetting the existence of ontological determination, which in turn can lead to pre-critical 
realism: entities are seen as what is in itself.  Conversely, the task of fundamental ontology is to 
“wrest the forgetfulness away from what is apprehended in the projection  of our understanding 
of Being ” (GA 3: 233).  In this context, to insist on the independence and unknowability of the 
Real as such is essential to prevent the illusion arising that the way in which Dasein must 
disclose the Real is the way in which the Real is per se, and therefore the anthropocentric claim 
that Dasein’s perspective on what is should be the only one16. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
naςve realism of this claim is qualified by Heidegger’s second sentence (“only insofar as Dasein 
gives itself anything like being can … the first claim likewise be understood at all”), which 
reasserts the dependence of the empirical standpoint on its transcendental counterpart: from the 
transcendental standpoint, beings can only be “in their in-themselves” if we have an 
understanding of being, i.e.  if they are ontologically determined as beings.   
15 GA 3: 233.  In Being and Time, falling refers to the movement by which Dasein seeks to hide 
from its ontological lack of essence by covering it up with ontical identities and roles.  However 
the two definitions are not inconsistent.  Dasein can only identify fully with a role provided by 
the “One” if it remains unaware of the fact that such a role is merely an existential possibility 
among others.  This entails a misconception of itself as a being endowed with a nature 
(understood as a fixed set of essential properties), which, in turn, is only possible if Dasein 
forgets that its real essence lies in the lack of such a nature, and thus in its having a projective 
understanding of Being.   
16 I do not have enough space to develop this second point further, but it is particularly 
important in the light of the development of Heidegger's thought after Being and Time, which is 
more and more concerned with the danger of anthropocentrism.  Thus, Heidegger's well-known 
reversal, in the Letter on Humanism, of the relation between Dasein and Being (Dasein is 
characterised as the “shepherd” of Being instead of being the entity on whom Being depends for 
its projection, and thus the starting point for fundamental ontology) is another strategy meant to 
However, it does not follow from this that the Real cannot be known at all.  As far as Kant's 
position is concerned, Allison contends that our impossibility to know things-in-themselves can 
be analytically deduced from the fact that transcendental conditions are determinative of 
representations.  Thus, the “forms of sensibility, or more properly, the content of such forms, 
must be assigned solely to the cognitive apparatus of the human mind and, therefore,  cannot … 
also be attributed to things considered in themselves” (Allison 1996: 9).  This, in turn, is the 
ground for the famous claim that things-in-themselves can be neither in space nor in time17.  
According to Allison, the two claims (the impossibility of knowing things-in-themselves and the 
idea that they are neither in time nor in space) do not conflict because while the first refutes the 
possibility of forming a synthetic knowledge of things-in-themselves, the second rests on an 
analytic inference from the nature of transcendental determination.  Thus, the claim that things-
in-themselves are neither in space nor in time “does not involve any synthetic a priori judgment 
about how things really are in contrast to how they merely seem to us.  On the contrary, it 
involves merely analytic judgments or, perhaps more accurately, methodological directives, 
which specify how we must conceive of things when we consider them in abstraction from the 
relation to human sensibility and its a priori forms” (Allison 1983: 241).  Heidegger agrees that 
while entities are fully knowable, the Real cannot be known as it is, independently of Dasein’s 
mode of access to it.  However, the two-aspect view, if taken seriously, entails that phenomena 
must not be seen as radically distinct from noumena: they are the same things, considered either 
within a transcendental framework or without.  This, in turn, has an important consequence for 
Heidegger: since entities are not substantially different from the Real, the ontic knowledge we 
can acquire of entities must somehow pertain to the Real.  We cannot say how the properties of 
entities pertain to the Real, as this would require us to occupy de facto the transcendental 
standpoint and to form synthetic judgment about the nature of the Real.  But although we can 
never be sure of the ways in which our knowledge applies to the Real, it would nevertheless be 
wrong to think that our framework does not capture at least some of its properties -- on the 
contrary, this is analytically entailed by the two aspects view of transcendental idealism.  What 
makes this debatable within the context of Kant's doctrine is that there are other elements in his 
thought (in particular in the Transcendental Dialectics and in the Second Critique) which incline 
towards a two-world view.  However, Heidegger differs from Kant in that he unequivocally 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
counter the risk of an absolutisation of our finitude.  Similarly, I have suggested that the 
introduction of “earth” in the Origin of the Artwork could be seen as a reworking of the notion of 
the Real in Being and Time.  See Han-Pile 2003: 120-45.  
17 This claim has been criticised by many commentators, in particular Strawson 1989: 60 and 
the appendix to the book, and Guyer 1987: chapter 16, mainly on the grounds that a) it is not 
supported by the Transcendental Aesthetic and b) that it clashes with the idea that we cannot 
know things-in-themselves.  See, for example, Kemp-Smith (2003): 113-114.  Similar objections 
were raised in Kant's time, in particular by Mendelssohn (see Allison’s discussion in “The Non 
spatiality of things-in-themselves for Kant”).  I also found a very useful overview of these 
arguments in the yet unpublished manuscript of Sally Sheldon’s very interesting Ph.D thesis, 
“The Problematic Meaning of Transcendental Idealism” (Essex, 2001)).  Allison’s reply to the 
first line of criticism is that it is possible to find such evidence in the Transcendental Aesthetic 
(see Allison 1983, chapter 5).  For his reply to the second, see the main text of this paper.   
           
supports the two aspect view.  Therefore although metaphysical realism is not a legitimate 
position for him, the idea that the Real would be by definition completely closed off from us is 
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